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Abstract. Default logic is one of the most popular and successful formalisms
for non-monotonic reasoning. In 2002, Bonatti and Olivetti introduced several
sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical reasoning in propositional default
logic. In this paper we examine these calculi from a proof-complexity perspec-
tive. In particular, we show that the calculus for credulous reasoning obeys
almost the same bounds on the proof size as Gentzen’s system LK . Hence prov-
ing lower bounds for credulous reasoning will be as hard as proving lower bounds
for LK . On the other hand, we show an exponential lower bound to the proof
size in Bonatti and Olivetti’s enhanced calculus for skeptical default reasoning.
1 Introduction
Trying to understand the nature of human reasoning has been one of the most
fascinating adventures since ancient times. It has long been argued that due to
its monotonicity, classical logic is not adequate to express the flexibility of com-
monsense reasoning. To overcome this deficiency, a number of formalisms have
been introduced (cf. [20]), of which Reiter’s default logic [21] is one of the most
popular and widely used systems. Default logic extends the usual logical (first-
order or propositional) derivations by patterns for default assumptions. These
are of the form “in the absence of contrary information, assume . . . ”. Reiter
argued that his logic adequately formalizes human reasoning under the closed
world assumption. Today default logic is widely used in artificial intelligence
and computational logic.
The semantics and the complexity of default logic have been intensively
studied during the last decades (cf. [7] for a survey). In particular, Gottlob [13]
has identified and studied two reasoning tasks for propositional default logic:
the credulous and the skeptical reasoning problem which can be understood as
analogues of the classical problems SAT and TAUT. Due to the stronger ex-
pressibility of default logic, however, credulous and skeptical reasoning become
harder than their classical counterparts—they are complete for the second level
Σp2 and Π
p
2 of the polynomial hierarchy, respectively [13].
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Less is known about the complexity of proofs in default logic. While there
is a rich body of results for propositional proof systems (cf. [17]), proof com-
plexity of non-classical logics has only recently attracted more attention, and
a number of exciting results have been obtained for modal and intuitionistic
logics [14–16]. Starting with Reiter’s work [21], several proof-theoretic methods
have been developed for default logic (cf. [1,11,18,19,22] and [9] for a survey).
However, most of these formalisms employ external constraints to model non-
monotonic deduction and thus cannot be considered purely axiomatic (cf. [10]
for an argument). This was achieved by Bonatti and Olivetti [4] who designed
simple and elegant sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical default reasoning.
Subsequently, Egly and Tompits [10] extended Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculi to
first-order default logic and showed a speed-up of these calculi over classical
first-order logic, i.e., they construct sequences of first-order formulae which
need long classical proofs but have short derivations using default rules.
In the present paper we investigate the original calculi of Bonatti and
Olivetti [4] from a proof-complexity perspective. Apart from some preliminary
observations in [4], this comprises, to our knowledge, the first comprehensive
study of lengths of proofs in propositional default logic. Our results can be
summarized as follows. Bonatti and Olivetti’s credulous default calculus BOcred
obeys almost the same bounds to the proof size as Gentzen’s propositional se-
quent calculus LK , i.e., we show that upper bounds to the proof size in both
calculi are polynomially related. The same result also holds for the proof length
(the number of steps in the system). Thus, proving lower bounds to the size
of BOcred will be as hard as proving lower bounds to LK (or, equivalently,
to Frege systems), which constitutes a major challenge in propositional proof
complexity [5,17]. This result also has implications for automated theorem prov-
ing. Namely, we transfer the non-automatizability result of Bonet, Pitassi, and
Raz [6] for Frege systems to default logic: BOcred -proofs cannot be efficiently
generated, unless factoring integers is possible in polynomial time.
While already BOcred appears to be a strong proof system for credulous de-
fault reasoning, admitting very concise proofs, we also exhibit a general method
of how to construct a proof system Cred(P ) for credulous reasoning from a
propositional proof system P . This system Cred(P ) bears the same relation to
P with respect to proof size as BOcred does to LK . Thus, choosing for exam-
ple P as extended Frege might lead to stronger proof systems for credulous
reasoning.
For skeptical reasoning, the situation is different. Bonatti and Olivetti [4]
construct two proof systems for this task. While they already show an exponen-
tial lower bound for their first skeptical calculus, we obtain also an exponential
lower bound to the proof length in their enhanced skeptical calculus. This lower
bound also holds if the enhanced calculus is augmented by further rules such
as the cut rule.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we start with some background
information on proof systems and default logic. The calculi of Bonatti and
Olivetti [4] consist of four main ingredients: classical sequents, antisequents to
refute non-tautologies, a residual calculus, and default rules. Thus we start our
investigation in Sect. 3 by analyzing the preliminary antisequent and residual
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calculi. Our main results on the proof complexity of credulous and skeptical
default reasoning follow in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. In Sect. 6, we conclude
with a discussion and some open questions.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with propositional logic and basic notions from com-
plexity theory (cf. [17]). By L we denote the set of all propositional formulae
over some fixed standard set of connectives. For T ⊆ L, the set of all logical
consequences of T will be denoted by Th(T ).
2.1 Proof Systems
Cook and Reckhow [8] defined the notion of a proof system for an arbitrary
language L as a polynomial-time computable function f with range L. A string
w with f(w) = x is called an f -proof for x ∈ L. Proof systems for L = TAUT
are called propositional proof systems. The sequent calculus LK of Gentzen [12]
is one of the most important and best studied propositional proof systems. It is
well known that LK and Frege systems mutually p-simulate each other(cf. [17]).
There are two measures which are of primary interest in proof complexity.
The first is the minimal size of an f -proof for some given element x ∈ L. To
make this precise, let sf (x) = min{|w| | f(w) = x} and sf (n) = max{sf (x) |
|x| ≤ n}. We say that the proof system f is t-bounded if sf (n) ≤ t(n) for all
n ∈ N. If t is a polynomial, then f is called polynomially bounded. Another
interesting parameter of a proof is the length defined as the number of proof
steps. This measure only makes sense for proof systems where proofs consist
of lines containing formulae or sequents. This is the case for LK and most
systems studied in this paper. For such a system f , we let tf (ϕ) = min{k |
f(pi) = ϕ and pi uses k steps} and tf (n) = max{tf (ϕ) | |ϕ| ≤ n}. Obviously, it
holds that tf (n) ≤ sf (n), but the two measures are even polynomially related
for a number of natural systems as extended Frege (cf. [17]).
For sequent calculi one distinguishes between dag-like and tree-like proofs
where in the latter notion each derived sequent can be used at most once as a
prerequisite of a rule. While for LK these two measures are equivalent [17], we
will concentrate here only on the stronger dag-like model.
2.2 Default Logic
Default logic is an extension of classical logic that has been proposed by Reiter
[21]. The logic is non-monotonic in the sense that an increase in information
may decrease the number of consequences. A default theory 〈W,D〉 consists of
a set W of propositional sentences and a set D of defaults. A default (rule) δ is
an inference rule of the form α : β
γ
, where α and γ are propositional formulae
and β is a set of propositional formulae. The prerequisite α is also referred to as
p(δ), the formulae in β are called justifications (referred to as j(δ)), and γ is the
conclusion that is referred to as c(δ). Stable extensions are originally defined in
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terms of a fixed-point equation [21], but we use the following characterization
as a starting definition:
Theorem 1 (Reiter [21]). Let E ⊆ L be a set of formulae and 〈W,D〉 be a
default theory. Furthermore let E0 = W, and
Ei+1 = Th(Ei) ∪ {c(δ) | δ ∈ D,Ei ` p(δ),¬j(δ) ∩ E = ∅} ,
where ¬j(δ) denotes the set of all negated sentences contained in j(δ). Then E
is a (stable) extension of 〈W,D〉 if and only if E = ⋃i∈NEi.
A default theory 〈W,D〉 can have none or several stable extensions (cf. [2,13]
for examples). A sentence ψ ∈ L is credulously entailed by 〈W,D〉 if ψ holds in
some stable extension of 〈W,D〉. If ψ holds in every extension of 〈W,D〉, then
ψ is skeptically entailed by 〈W,D〉.
Default rules with empty justification are called residues. Let Lres = L ∪{
α
γ | α, γ ∈ L
}
be the set of all formulae and residues. Residues can be used to
alternatively characterize stable extensions. For a set D of defaults and E ⊆ L
let
RES(D,E) =
{
p(δ)
c(δ)
∣∣∣∣ δ ∈ D, E ∩ ¬j(δ) = ∅} .
Apparently, RES(D,E) is a set of residues. We can then build stable extensions
via the following closure operator. For a set R of residues we define Cl0(W,R) =
W and
Cli+1(W,R) = Th(Cli(W,R)) ∪
{
γ
∣∣∣∣ αγ ∈ R,α ∈ Th(Cli(W,R))} .
Let Cl(W,R) =
⋃∞
i=0Cli(W,R). Then for the sets Ei from Theorem 1 the
following holds:
Proposition 2 (Bonatti, Olivetti [4]). Let 〈W,D〉 be a default theory and
let E ⊆ L. Then Ei = Cli(W,RES(D,E)) for all i ∈ N. In particular, E is a
stable extension of 〈W,D〉 if and only if E = Cl(W,RES(D,E)).
If D only contains residues, then there is an easier way of characterizing Cl:
Lemma 3 (Bonatti, Olivetti [4]). For D ⊆ Lres \ L, W ⊆ L, and for i ∈ N
let
C0 = W and Ci+1 = Ci ∪
{
γ
∣∣∣∣ αγ ∈ D,α ∈ Th(Ci)} .
Then γ ∈ Cl(W,D) if and only if there exists k ∈ N with γ ∈ Th(Ck).
3 Proof Complexity of the Antisequent and Residual Calculi
Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculi for default logic use four main ingredients: usual
propositional sequents and rules of LK , antisequents to refute formulae, residual
rules, and default rules. In this section we will investigate the complexity of the
antisequent calculus AC and the residual calculus RC .
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We start with the definition of Bonatti’s antisequent calculus AC from [3].
A related refutation calculus for first-order logic was previously developed by
Tiomkin [23]. In AC we use antisequents Γ 0 ∆, where Γ,∆ ⊆ L. Intuitively,
Γ 0 ∆ means that
∨
∆ does not follow from
∧
Γ . Axioms of AC are all sequents
Γ 0 ∆, where Γ and ∆ are disjoint sets of propositional variables. The inference
rules of AC are shown in Fig. 1. For this calculus, Bonatti [3] shows:
Γ 0 Σ,α
(¬ 0)
Γ,¬α 0 Σ
Γ,α 0 Σ
(0 ¬)
Γ 0 Σ,¬α
Γ, α, β 0 Σ
(∧ 0)
Γ, α ∧ β 0 Σ
Γ 0 Σ,α
(0 •∧)
Γ 0 Σ,α ∧ β
Γ 0 Σ, β
(0 ∧•)
Γ 0 Σ,α ∧ β
Γ 0 Σ,α, β
(0 ∨)
Γ 0 Σ,α ∨ β
Γ, α 0 Σ
(•∨ 0)
Γ, α ∨ β 0 Σ
Γ, β 0 Σ
(∨• 0)
Γ, α ∨ β 0 Σ
Γ,α 0 Σ, β
(0→)
Γ 0 Σ,α→ β
Γ 0 Σ,α
(• →0)
Γ, α→ β 0 Σ
Γ, β 0 Σ
(→ • 0)
Γ, α→ β 0 Σ
Fig. 1. Inference rules of the antisequent calculus AC .
Theorem 4 (Bonatti [3]). The antisequent calculus AC is sound and com-
plete.
Concerning the size of proofs in the antisequent calculus we observe:
Proposition 5. The antisequent calculus AC is polynomially bounded.
Proof. Observe that the calculus contains only unary inference rules, each of
which reduces the logical complexity of one of the contained formulae (if per-
ceived bottom-up). Thus each use of an inference rule decrements the size of
the formulae by at least one. After a linear number of steps we end up with only
propositional variables which we cannot reduce any further. Each antisequent
is of linear size, hence the complete derivation has quadratic size. uunionsq
The above observation is not very astounding, since, to verify Γ 0 ∆ we
could alternatively guess assignments to the propositional variables in Γ and ∆
and thereby verify antisequents in NP.
We now turn to the residual calculus RC of Bonatti and Olivetti [4]. Its
objects are residual sequents 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ and residual antisequents 〈W,R〉 0 ∆
where W,∆ ⊆ L and R ⊆ Lres . The intuitive meaning is that ∆ does (respec-
tively does not) follow from W using the residues R. The rules of RC comprise
of the inference rules from Fig. 2 together with the rules of LK and AC . How-
ever, the use of rules from LK and AC is restricted to purely propositional
(anti)sequents. For this calculus, Bonatti and Olivetti [4] showed:
Theorem 6 (Bonatti, Olivetti [4]). The residual calculus RC is sound and
complete, i.e., for all default theories 〈W,R〉 with R ⊆ Lres and all ∆ ⊆ L,
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Γ ` ∆(Re1)
Γ, α
γ
` ∆
Γ ` α Γ, γ ` ∆
(Re2)
Γ, α
γ
` ∆
Γ 6` ∆ Γ 6` α
(Re3)
Γ, α
γ
6` ∆
Γ, γ 6` ∆
(Re4)
Γ, α
γ
6` ∆
Fig. 2. Inference rules of the residual calculus RC .
1. 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ is derivable in RC if and only if ∨∆ ∈ Cl(W,R);
2. 〈W,R〉 0 ∆ is derivable in RC if and only if ∨∆ /∈ Cl(W,R).
To bound the lengths of proofs in this calculus we exploit the property that
residues only have to be used at a certain level and are not used to deduce any
formulae afterwards (cf. Lemma 3). Using this we prove that the complexity of
RC is tightly linked to that of LK .
Lemma 7. There exist a polynomial p and a constant c such that sRC (n) ≤
p(n) · sLK (cn) and tRC (n) ≤ p(n) · tLK (cn).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. First we will show the bounds stated
above for sequents. In the second part we will then show that antisequents even
admit polynomial-size proofs in RC .
Assume first that we want to derive the sequent 〈W,R〉 ` ∆, whereW,∆ ⊆ L
and R = {r1, . . . , rk} is a set of residues with ri = αiγi . Let R′ ⊆ R be minimal
with respect to the size |R′| such that 〈W,R′〉 ` ∆. We may w.l.o.g. assume
that R′ = {r1, . . . , rk′} and k′ ≤ k. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, we may assume
that the rules ri are ordered in the way they are applied when computing the
sets Ci. In particular, this means that for each i = 1, . . . , k′,
W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1} ` αi
is a true propositional sequent for which we fix an LK -proof Πi. We augment
Πi by k′ − i applications of rule (Re1) to obtain
〈W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1}, {ri+1, . . . , rk′}〉 ` αi .
Let us call the proof of this sequent Π ′i.
The proof tree depicted in Fig. 3 for deriving 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ unfurls as follows.
We start with an LK -proof for the sequent W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γk′} ` ∆ and then
apply k′-times the rule (Re2) in the step
〈W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1}, {ri+1, . . . , rk′}〉 ` αi 〈W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi}, {ri+1, . . . , rk′}〉 ` ∆
〈W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γi−1}, {ri, . . . , rk′}〉 ` ∆
to reach 〈W,R′〉 ` ∆. To derive the left prerequisite we use the proof Π ′i. Finally
we use k − k′ applications of the rule (Re1) to get 〈W,R〉 ` ∆.
Our proof for 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ uses at most (k′ + 1) · tLK (n) + k
′(k′+1)
2 + k
steps, i.e., tRC (n) ≤ O(n · tLK (n) + n2). Each sequent is of linear size. Hence,
sRC (n) ≤ p(n) · sLK (n) for some polynomial p.
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Π ′1
Π ′2
Π ′k′ 〈W ∪ {γ1, . . . , γk′}, ∅〉 ` ∆
(Re2)
...
〈W ∪ {γ1, γ2}, {r3, . . . , rk′}〉 ` ∆
(Re2)〈W ∪ {γ1}, {r2, . . . , rk′}〉 ` ∆
(Re2)〈W,R′〉 ` ∆
(Re1)
...
〈W,R〉 ` ∆
Fig. 3. Proof tree for the sequent 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ in the residual calculus.
In the second part of the proof we will now show that any true antisequent
has an RC -proof of polynomial size, thus concluding the proof. Let 〈W,R〉 0 ∆
be the antisequent we wish to prove. Again, let R = {r1, . . . , rk} with ri = αiγi ,
and let {i1, . . . , i`} = I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} be a set of maximal cardinality such that〈
W ∪⋃i∈I{γi}〉 0 ∆ and let I ′ = {i`+1, . . . , ik} = {1, . . . , k} \ I.
Because of 〈W,R〉 0 ∆, the set I contains all indices i with αi ∈ Cl(W ).
Therefore, for each j ∈ I ′ we have W ∪ ⋃i∈I{γi} 0 αj . We fix a polynomial-
size AC -proof Πj of this antisequent. Augmenting these proofs with ` appli-
cations of (Re4) we obtain a proof Π ′j of
〈
W,
⋃
i∈I{ri}
〉
0 αj . Similarly, as〈
W ∪⋃i∈I{γi}〉 0 ∆ we get a polynomial-size proofΠ ′k+1 of 〈W,⋃i∈I{ri}〉 0 ∆.
Now, the proof for 〈W,R〉 0 ∆ ends with the following application of (Re3)〈
W, {ri1 , . . . , rik−1}
〉
0 ∆
〈
W, {ri1 , . . . , rik−1}
〉
0 αik
〈W, {ri1 , . . . , rik}〉 0 ∆
More generally, for all choices of s, t with ` < s < t ≤ k + 1 we use the (Re3)-
step 〈
W, {ri1 , . . . , ris−1}
〉
0 αit
〈
W, {ri1 , . . . , ris−1}
〉
0 αis
〈W, {ri1 , . . . , ris}〉 0 αit
where we set αk+1 =
∨
∆. After all these steps, it remains to derive the an-
tisequents 〈W, {ri1 , . . . , ri`}〉 0 αit for ` < t ≤ k + 1. But for these we have
already built the proofs Π ′t. Therefore, we have constructed an RC -proof of
〈W,R〉 0 ∆ which apart from the AC -proofs Π ′t uses only O(k2) applications of
(Re3) and (Re4). As each antisequent in the proof is of linear size, we obtain
a polynomial-size RC -proof of 〈W,R〉 0 ∆. uunionsq
Let us remark that while the RC -proof of 〈W,R〉 ` ∆ in Fig. 3 is tree-like,
this is not true for our dag-like RC -proof of 〈W,R〉 0 ∆ constructed in the
second part of the proof of Lemma 7.
4 Proof Complexity of Credulous Default Reasoning
Now we turn to the analysis of Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculus for credulous
default reasoning. An essential ingredient of the calculus are provability con-
straints which resemble a necessity modality. Provability constraints are of the
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form Lα or ¬Lα with α ∈ L. A set E ⊆ L satisfies a constraint Lα if α ∈ Th(E).
Similarly, E satisfies ¬Lα if α 6∈ Th(E).
We can now describe the calculus BOcred of Bonatti and Olivetti [4] for
credulous default reasoning. A credulous default sequent is a 3-tuple 〈Σ,Γ,∆〉,
denoted by Σ;Γ |∼∆, where Γ = 〈W,D〉 is a default theory, Σ is a set of
provability constraints and ∆ is a set of propositional sentences. Semantically,
the sequent Σ;Γ |∼∆ is true, if there exists a stable extension E of Γ which
satisfies all of the constraints in Σ and
∨
∆ ∈ E. The calculus BOcred uses such
sequents and extends LK , AC , and RC by the inference rules in Fig. 4.
Γ ` ∆(cD1) (Γ ⊆ Lres)
; Γ |∼∆
Γ ` α Σ; Γ |∼∆
(cD2) (Γ ⊆ Lres)
Lα, Σ; Γ |∼∆
Γ 6` α Σ; Γ |∼∆
(cD3) (Γ ⊆ Lres)¬Lα, Σ; Γ |∼∆
L¬βi, Σ; Γ |∼∆
(cD4)
Σ; Γ, α: β1...βn
γ
|∼∆
¬L¬β1 . . .¬L¬βn, Σ; Γ, αγ |∼∆
(cD5)
Σ; Γ, α: β1...βn
γ
|∼∆
Fig. 4. Inference rules for the credulous default calculus BOcred .
For this calculus Bonatti and Olivetti [4] show the following:
Theorem 8 (Bonatti, Olivetti [4]). BOcred is sound and complete, i.e., a
credulous default sequent is true if and only if it is derivable in BOcred .
We now investigate lengths of proofs in BOcred . Our next lemma shows that
upper bounds on the proof size of RC can be transferred to BOcred .
Lemma 9. For any function t(n), if RC is t(n)-bounded, then BOcred is p(n) ·
t(n)-bounded for some polynomial p. The same relation holds for the number of
steps in RC and BOcred .
Proof. Let Σ;Γ |∼∆ be a true credulous default sequent. We will construct a
BOcred -derivation of Σ;Γ |∼∆ starting from the bottom with the given sequent.
Observe that we cannot use any of the rules (cD1) through (cD3) as long
as Γ contains proper defaults with nonempty justification. Thus we first have
to reduce all defaults to residues plus some set of constraints using (cD4) or
(cD5). As one of these rules has to be applied exactly once for each appearance
of some default in Γ we end up with Σ′;Γ ′|∼∆, where |Σ′| is polynomial in
|Γ ∪Σ| and Γ ′ is equal to Γ on its propositional part and contains some of the
corresponding residues instead of the defaults from Γ . From this point on we
can only use rules (cD2) and (cD3) until we have eliminated all constraints
and then finally apply rule (cD1) once. Thus, BOcred -proofs look as shown in
Fig. 5 where RC indicates a derivation in the residual calculus and σ is the
remaining constraint from Σ after applications of (cD2) or (cD3). Hence we
obtain the bounds on sBOcred and tBOcred . uunionsq
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RC
RC
RC
(cD1)
Γ ′|∼∆
(cD2) or (cD3)
σ;Γ ′|∼∆
(cD2) or (cD3)
...
Σ′′;Γ ′|∼∆
(cD2) or (cD3)
Σ′;Γ ′|∼∆
(cD4) or (cD5)
...
Σ;Γ |∼∆
Fig. 5. The structure of the BOcred -proof in Lemma 9
Combining Lemmas 7 and 9 we obtain our main result in this section stating
a tight connection between the proof complexity of LK and BOcred .
Theorem 10. There exist a polynomial p and a constant c such that sLK (n) ≤
sBOcred (n) ≤ p(n) · sLK (cn) and tLK (n) ≤ tBOcred (n) ≤ p(n) · tLK (cn).
In the light of this result, proving either non-trivial lower or upper bounds to
the proof size of BOcred seems very difficult—as such a result would mean a
major breakthrough in propositional proof complexity (cf. [3, 17]).
4.1 On the Automatizability of BOcred
Practitioners are not only interested in the size of a proof, but face the more
complicated problem to actually construct a proof for a given instance. Of
course, in the presence of super-polynomial lower bounds to the proof size this
cannot be done in polynomial time. Thus, in proof search the best one can hope
for is the following notion of automatizability:
Definition 11 (Bonet, Pitassi, Raz [6]). A proof system P for a language
L is automatizable if there exists a deterministic procedure that takes as input
a string x and outputs a P -proof of x in time polynomial in the size of the
shortest P -proof of x if x ∈ L. If x 6∈ L, then the behaviour of the algorithm is
unspecified.
For practical purposes automatizable systems would be very desirable. Search-
ing for a proof we may not find the shortest one, but we are guaranteed to find
one that is only polynomially longer. Unfortunately, for BOcred there are strong
limitations towards this goal as our next result shows:
Theorem 12. BOcred is not automatizable unless factoring integers is possible
in polynomial time.
Proof. First we observe that automatizability of BOcred implies automatizabil-
ity of Frege systems. For this let ϕ be a propositional tautology. By assump-
tion, we can construct a BOcred -proof of ∅|∼ϕ. This BOcred -proof contains an
LK -proof of ∅ ` ϕ by rule (cD1). As LK is polynomially equivalent to Frege
systems [17], we can construct from this LK -proof a Frege proof of ϕ in poly-
nomial time. By a result of Bonet, Pitassi, and Raz [6], Frege systems are not
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automatizable unless Blum integers can be factored in polynomial time (a Blum
integer is the product of two primes which are both congruent 3 modulo 4). uunionsq
4.2 A General Construction of Proof Systems for Credulous
Default Reasoning
In this section we will explain a general method how to construct proof systems
for credulous default reasoning. These proof systems arise from the canonical
Σp2 algorithm for credulous default reasoning (Algorithm 1). Algorithm 1 first
guesses a generating set Gext for a potential stable extension and then verifies by
the stage construction from Theorem 1 that Gext indeed generates a stable ex-
tension which moreover contains the formula ϕ. Algorithm 1 is a Σp2 procedure,
i.e., it can be executed by a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine
M with access to a coNP-oracle. The nondeterminism solely lies in line 1 and
the oracle queries are made in lines 6 and 11 to the coNP-complete problem of
propositional implication IMP = {〈Ψ, ϕ〉 | Ψ ⊆ L, ϕ ∈ L, and Ψ |= ϕ}.
Algorithm 1 A Σp2 procedure for credulous default reasoning
Require: 〈W,D〉, ϕ
1: guess D0 ⊆ D and let Gext ←W ∪
n
γ | α:β
γ
∈ D0
o
2: Gnew ←W
3: repeat
4: Gold ← Gnew
5: for all α:β
γ
∈ D do
6: if Gold |= α and Gext 6|= ¬β then
7: Gnew ← Gnew ∪ {γ}
8: end if
9: end for
10: until Gnew = Gold
11: if Gnew = Gext and Gext |= ϕ then
12: return true
13: else
14: return false
15: end if
Algorithm 1 can be converted into a proof system for credulous default
reasoning as follows. We fix a propositional proof system P and define a proof
system Cred(P ) for credulous default reasoning where proofs are of the form
〈W,D,ϕ, comp, q1, . . . , qk, a1, . . . , ak〉 .
Here comp is a computation of M on input 〈W,D,ϕ〉 and q1, . . . , qk are the
queries to IMP during this computation. If the IMP-query qi = 〈Ψi, ϕi〉 is
answered positively, then ai is a P -proof of
(∧
ψ∈Ψi ψ
)
→ ϕi, otherwise ai is an
assignment falsifying this formula. For this proof system we obtain the following
bounds:
Theorem 13. Let P be a propositional proof system. Then Cred(P ) is a proof
system for credulous default reasoning with sP (n) ≤ sCred(P )(n) ≤ O(n2sP (n)).
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Proof. The first inequality holds because we can use Cred(P ) to prove propo-
sitional tautologies ϕ by choosing W = D = ∅.
For the second inequality, we observe that Algorithm 1 has quadratic run-
ning time. In particular, a computation of Algorithm 1 contains at most a
quadratic number of queries to IMP. Each of these queries is of linear size
because it only consists of formulae from the input. If the query is answered
positively, then we have to supply a P -proof and there exists such a P -proof
of size ≤ sP (n). For a negative answer we just include an assignment of linear
size. This yields sCred(P )(n) ≤ O(n2sP (n)). uunionsq
Theorem 13 tells us that proving lower bounds for proof systems for cred-
ulous default reasoning is more or less the same as proving lower bounds to
propositional proof systems. In particular, we get:
Corollary 14. There exists a polynomially bounded proof system for credulous
default reasoning if and only if there exists a polynomially bounded propositional
proof system.
5 Lower Bounds for Skeptical Default Reasoning
Bonatti and Olivetti [4] introduce two calculi for skeptical default reasoning. As
before, objects are sequents of the form Σ;Γ |∼∆, where Σ is a set of constraints,
Γ is a propositional default theory, and ∆ is a set of propositional formulae. But
now, the sequent Σ;Γ |∼∆ is true, if ∨∆ holds in all extensions of Γ satisfying
the constraints in Σ.
The first calculus BOskep consists of the defining axioms of LK and AC ,
the inference rules of LK , AC , RC , and the rules from Fig. 6. Bonatti and
Γ ` ∆(sD1) (Γ ⊆ Lres)
Σ;Γ |∼∆
Γ ` α(sD2) (Γ ⊆ Lres)¬Lα,Σ;Γ |∼∆
Γ 6` α
(sD3) (Γ ⊆ Lres)
Lα,Σ;Γ |∼∆
¬L¬β1, . . . ,¬L¬βn, Σ;Γ, αγ |∼∆ L¬β1, Σ;Γ |∼∆ . . . L¬βn, Σ;Γ |∼∆
(sD4)
Σ;Γ, α:β1...βn
γ
|∼∆
Fig. 6. Inference rules for the skeptical default calculus BOskep .
Olivetti show that each true sequent is derivable in BOskep , i.e., the calculus is
sound and complete. However, they already remark that proofs in BOskep are
of exponential size in the number of default rules in the sequent. This is due to
the residual rules for they cannot be applied unless all defaults with nonempty
justifications have been eliminated using rule (sD4).
To get more concise proofs, Bonatti and Olivetti [4] suggest an enhanced
calculus BO ′skep where the rules (sD1) to (sD3) are replaced by rules (sD1
′) to
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(sD3′) and rule (sD4) is kept (see Fig. 7). Bonatti and Olivetti prove sound-
ness and completeness for BO ′skep . Moreover, they show that BO
′
skep is exponen-
tially separated from BOskep , i.e., there exist sequents (Sn)n≥1 which require
exponential-size proofs in BOskep but have linear-size derivations in BO ′skep . In
Σ′, Γ ′ ` ∆
(sD1’)
Σ;Γ |∼∆
Σ;Γ |∼α
(sD2’) ¬Lα,Σ;Γ |∼∆
Γ ′′ 6` α
(sD3’)
Lα,Σ;Γ |∼∆
¬L¬β1, . . . ,¬L¬βn, Σ;Γ, αγ |∼∆ L¬β1, Σ;Γ |∼∆ . . . L¬βn, Σ;Γ |∼∆
(sD4)
Σ;Γ, α:β1...βn
γ
|∼∆
where Σ′ ⊆ {α | Lα ∈ Σ}, Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ∩ Lres , and Γ ′′ = (Γ ∩ L) ∪
n
p(δ)
c(δ)
˛˛˛
δ ∈ Γ
o
.
Fig. 7. Inference rules for the enhanced skeptical default calculus BO ′skep .
our next result we will show an exponential lower bound to the proof length
(and therefore also to the proof size) in the enhanced skeptical calculus BO ′skep .
Theorem 15. The calculus BO ′skep has exponential lower bounds to the lengths
of proofs. More precisely, there exist sequents Sn of size O(n) such that every
BO ′skep-proof of Sn uses 2
Ω(n) steps. Therefore, sBO ′skep (n), tBO ′skep (n) ∈ 2Ω(n).
Proof. (Sketch) We construct a sequence (Sn)n≥1 = (Σn;Γn|∼ψn)n≥1 such that
for some constant c, every BO ′skep-proof of Sn has length at least 2
Ω(n). We
choose Σn = ∅, ψn = A2n, and Γn = 〈∅, D2n〉, where D2n consists of the defaults
listed in Fig. 8. The default theory Γn possesses 2n+1 stable extensions. Observe
that each of these contains A2n, but that each pair of stable extensions differs
in truth assigned to the propositional variables A0, . . . , An. We claim that every
proof of Sn has exponential length in n. More precisely, we will show that rule
(sD4) has to be applied an exponential number of times.
We point out that our argument does not only work against tree-like proofs,
but also rules out the possibility of sub-exponential dag-like derivations for
D2n|∼A2n. The lower bound is obtained from the fact that to derive A2n, we have
to derive Ai and ¬Ai for each n < i < 2n, each of which can only be achieved
from ancestors with mutually different proof constraints. This, by definition of
BOskep , leads to mutually disjoint sets of ancestor sequents.
The complete proof of the theorem is contained in the appendix. uunionsq
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that with respect to lengths of proofs, proof systems
for credulous default reasoning and for propositional logic are very close to
each other. Although deciding credulous default sequents is presumably harder
than deciding tautologies (the former is Σp2-complete [13], while the latter is
complete for coNP), the difference disappears when we want to prove these
objects (Sect. 4.2).
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: A0
A0
: ¬A0
¬A0
A0 : A1
A1
¬A0 : A1
A1
A0 : ¬A1
¬A1
¬A0 : ¬A1
¬A1
...
An−1 : An
An
¬An−1 : An
An
An−1 : ¬An
¬An
¬An−1 : ¬An
¬An
An : An−1
An+1
¬An : An−1
An+1
An : ¬An−1
¬An+1
¬An : ¬An−1
¬An+1
...
A2n−2 : A1
A2n−1
¬A2n−2 : A1
A2n−1
A2n−2 : ¬A1
¬A2n−1
¬A2n−2 : ¬A1
¬A2n−1
A2n−1 : A0
A2n
¬A2n−1 : A0
A2n
A2n−1 : ¬A0
A2n
¬A2n−1 : ¬A0
A2n
Fig. 8. The defaults in D2n in the proof of Theorem 15.
For skeptical reasoning this is less clear. While skeptical default reasoning
has polynomially bounded proof systems if and only if this holds for TAUT, we
leave open whether this equivalence extends to other bounds. However, in the
light of our exponential lower bound for BO ′skep (Theorem 15), searching for
natural proof systems for skeptical default reasoning with more concise proofs
will be a rewarding task for future research.
In this direction Bonatti and Olivetti [4] themselves introduced two rules to
supplement their enhanced calculus. These are the cut rule
Σ;Γ |∼α Σ;Γ, α|∼∆
(Cut)
Σ;Γ |∼∆
and the following version of the rule (sD4)
Σ0, Σ;Γ, αγ |∼∆ Σ1, Σ;Γ |∼∆ . . . Σn, Σ;Γ |∼∆
(sD4′)
Σ;Γ, α:β1...βnγ |∼∆
where Σi = L¬βpi(i),¬L¬βpi(i+1), . . . ,¬L¬βpi(n) for an arbitrary permutation pi
of {1, . . . , n}. While it is not hard to see that our lower bound in Theorem 15
still remains true if we add (sD4′) to BO ′skep , we leave open the problem to
show super-polynomial lower bounds in the presence of the cut rule.
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Technical Appendix
The appendix contains the full proof of Theorem 15 which was only briefly
sketched in the main part of the paper.
Theorem 15. The calculus BO ′skep has exponential lower bounds to the lengths
of proofs. More precisely, there exist sequents Sn of size O(n) such that every
BO ′skep-proof of Sn uses 2
Ω(n) steps. Therefore, sBO ′skep (n), tBO ′skep (n) ∈ 2Ω(n).
Proof. We construct a sequence (Sn)n≥1 = (Σn;Γn|∼ψn)n≥1 such that for some
constant c, every BO ′skep-proof of Sn has length at least 2
Ω(n). We choose Σn =
∅, ψn = A2n, and Γn = 〈∅, D2n〉, where D2n consists of the defaults listed in
Fig. 8. The default theory Γn possesses 2n+1 stable extensions. Observe that
each of these contains A2n, but that each pair of stable extensions differs in
truth assigned to the propositional variables A0, . . . , An. We claim that every
: A0
A0
: ¬A0
¬A0
A0 : A1
A1
¬A0 : A1
A1
A0 : ¬A1
¬A1
¬A0 : ¬A1
¬A1
...
An−1 : An
An
¬An−1 : An
An
An−1 : ¬An
¬An
¬An−1 : ¬An
¬An
An : An−1
An+1
¬An : An−1
An+1
An : ¬An−1
¬An+1
¬An : ¬An−1
¬An+1
...
A2n−2 : A1
A2n−1
¬A2n−2 : A1
A2n−1
A2n−2 : ¬A1
¬A2n−1
¬A2n−2 : ¬A1
¬A2n−1
A2n−1 : A0
A2n
¬A2n−1 : A0
A2n
A2n−1 : ¬A0
A2n
¬A2n−1 : ¬A0
A2n
Fig. 8. The defaults in D2n.
proof of Sn has exponential length in n. More precisely, we will show that rule
(sD4) has to be applied an exponential number of times.
To this end, let Π be a BO ′skep-proof of D2n|∼A2n. We show that Π has to
contain an application of (sD4) to a default rule deriving Ai or ¬Ai for any
sequent
Σ;D,R|∼A2n (1)
such that Σ is consistent and D2n can be partitioned into three sets I1, I2, I3
satisfying
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1. ¬L¬j(δ) ∈ Σ and p(δ)c(δ) ∈ R if δ ∈ I1,
2. L¬j(δ) ∈ Σ if δ ∈ I2,
3. δ ∈ D if δ ∈ I3, and
4. {Ai,¬Ai} ∩ {c(δ) | δ ∈ I1} = ∅ for some n < i ≤ 2n
To prove this claim, let Σ;D,R|∼A2n be a sequent as stated above and
n < i ≤ 2n be such that {Ai,¬Ai} ∩ {c(δ) | δ ∈ I1} = ∅. Suppose that Π
does not contain any application of (sD4) to default rules deriving Ai or ¬Ai.
Consequently, Σ;D,R|∼A2n is derived by an application of (sD1’), (sD2’),
(sD3’) or (sD4) to a default rule not deriving Ai or ¬Ai. We distinguish among
these possibilities.
(sD1’) Suppose Σ;D,R|∼A2n were derived by an application of (sD2’), then Π
had to contain the the sequent Σ′, R ` A2n, where Σ ⊆ {A2n−k,¬A2n−k |
n ≤ k ≤ 2n}. By the fourth condition, {Ai,¬Ai} ∩ {c(δ) | δ ∈ I1} = ∅.
Hence, R cannot contain any of the residual rules αi−1αi with αj ∈ {Aj ,¬Aj}.
Consequently, Σ′;R|∼A2n cannot be closed.
(sD2’) IfΣ;D,R|∼A2n were derived by an application of (sD2’), thenΠ had to
contain the antecedent Σ′, D,R|∼¬α2n−k, where α2n−k ∈ {A2n−k,¬A2n−k}
with n ≤ k ≤ 2n and Σ′ := Σ \ {¬L¬α2n−k}. However, Σ′;D,R|∼¬α2n−k
could in turn only be closed by using either of the default rules
A2n−k−1 : α˜2n−k ,
α˜2n−k
¬A2n−k−1 : α˜2n−k ,
α˜2n−k
where α˜2n−k ≡ ¬α2n−k: no other rules derives ¬A2n−k. Say that Π con-
tains an application of the first rule. By consistency of Σ, A2n−k−1:α˜2n−kα˜2n−k
has to be contained in D. Suppose w.l.o.g. that Π contains this applica-
tion in the previous step of Π. Then we obtain as the right ancestor se-
quent Σ′; L¬α˜2n−k;D′, R|∼α˜2n−k, where D′ := D \
{
A2n−k−1:α˜2n−k
α˜2n−k
}
. But
Σ′,L¬α˜2n−k;D′, R|∼α˜2n−k cannot be closed: The only default rule being
able to derive α˜2n−k remaining in D′ has a premise that is contradictory to
the premise of A2n−k−1:α˜2n−kα˜2n−k . By soundness of BO
′
skep , the ability to close this
sequent would therefore contradict the consistency of D2n. The case that
Π contains an application of the second rule, ¬A2n−k−1:α˜2n−kα˜2n−k , is completely
analogous.
(sD3’) Similarly, if the sequent Σ;D,R|∼A2n were derived by an application
of the rule (sD3’), then Π contained the sequent D′, R 0 ¬αl for some αl
such that L¬αl ∈ Σ, where D′ =
{
p(δ)
c(δ)
∣∣∣ δ ∈ D}. But if D′, R 0 ¬αl were
true, then there had to exist an 0 ≤ j ≤ l such that neither of the rules
Aj−1:αj
αj
, ¬Aj−1:αjαj , where αj ∈ {Aj ,¬Aj} for j < l, nor one of their residues
could be contained in D ∪R. Consequently, Π would again have to contain
the proof constraints L¬αj ,L¬¬αj ∈ Σ, contradictory to the consistency
of Σ.
(sD4’) Suppose that Σ;D,R|∼A2n is derived by an application of (sD4) to
the default rule αk−1:α2n−kαk ∈ D with αj ∈ {Aj ,¬Aj} and n < k 6= i. Then
Π contains the two ancestor sequents Σ,¬L¬α2n−k;D,R, αk−1αk |∼A2n and
Σ,L¬α2n−k;D,R|∼A2n. But as Σ,¬L¬α2n−k;D,R, αk−1αk |∼A2n still does not
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contain any residual rule deriving Ai or ¬Ai, the same arguments as for
Σ;D,R|∼A2n apply.
Concluding, the containment of Σ;D,R|∼A2n in Π enforces an application
of (sD4) to a default rule with conclusion Ai or ¬Ai. This yields the ancestor
sequents Σ,¬L¬α2n−i;D,R, αi−1αi |∼A2n and Σ,L¬α2n−i;D,R|∼A2n. The latter
of these still satisfies the requirements of (1). Thus, by the same arguments as
above, Π has to contain an application of (sD4) to a default rule
α′i−1:α
′
2n−i
α′i
,
where α′i ≡ ¬αi and α′2n−i ≡ ¬α2n−i. Each of these applications yields a sequent
satisfying (1) unless for these {Ai,¬Ai} ∩ {c(δ) | δ ∈ I1} 6= ∅ holds for all
n < i ≤ 2n; however, with mutually different proof constraints.
Summing up, to prove D2n|∼A2n, Π has to contain 22n−i+1 applications of
(sD4) to default rules with conclusion Ai or ¬Ai. Therefore, every proof of Sn
has length at least 2Ω(n). uunionsq
We point out that the above argument does not only work against tree-like
proofs, but also rules out the possibility of sub-exponential dag-like derivations
for D2n|∼A2n. The lower bound is obtained from the fact that to derive A2n, we
have to derive residual rules concluding Ai and ¬Ai for each n < i ≤ 2n, each
of which can only be achieved from ancestors with mutually different proof
constraints. This, by definition of BO ′skep , leads to mutually disjoint sets of
ancestor sequents.
17
